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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
mortgagor's failure to assign and deliver the policies or to reimburse
the mortgagee for any payments made by him for premiums.
It will be noted that nothing in the language of covenant "2" of
Section 258 would inform a mortgagor signing the New York short
form of mortgage that he was agreeing to a statutory acceleration
of maturity of principal in the event that he so failed to reimburse
the mortgagee or failed to assign and deliver the policies to him.
Indeed the covenant does not even mention the fact that if the mort-
gagor fails to insure as agreed that the mortgagee may insure the
buildings and pay the premiums and then look to the mortgagor for
reimbursement.
To overcome the discrepancy at present existing between the
language of this covenant "2" of Section 258 and its statutory con-
struction as given in Section 254(4), the legislature added at the
end of covenant "2" the following:
that he will assign and deliver the policies to the mortgagee; and that he will
reimburse the mortgagee for any premiums paid for insurance made by the
mortgagee on the mortgagor's default in so insuring the buildings or in so
assigning and delivering the policies.
A similar change has been made in the wording of Section 254, sub-
division 4, so as to make it more clearly relate to the language of
Section 258, clause "2".
The covenant in the mortgage providing for acceleration of ma-
turity of the principal sum in the case of certain defaults, i.e., cove-
nant "4" of Section 258, has been enlarged to include also the statu-
tory acceleration as construed by Section 254, subdivision 4, by the
addition of the words:
... or after default after notice and demand either in assigning and de-
livering the policies insuring the buildings against loss by fire or in reim-
bursing the mortgagee for premiums paid on such insurance, as hereinbefore
provided; or after default upon request in furnishing a statement of the
amount due on the bond and mortgage and whether any offsets or defenses
exist against the mortgage debt, as hereinafter provided.
It was desirable that this amendment to the New York Real
Property Law in relation to certain clauses in the statutory short
form mortgages and mortgage bonds and the construction thereof
should be made so that the language of the statute would not be mis-
leading and that the grace period might be made to apply to defaults
in the payment of installments of principal as well as to defaults in
interest payments.
MARY K. BLAIR.
IMPROVEMENT AND UNIFICATION OF PROVISIONS RELATING TO
NOTICES-OF CLAIM AGAINST PUBLIC CORPORATION.-As a matter
of common law a municipal corporation when acting in its govern-
mental or public capacity is not liable for its torts and when acting
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in its corporate or private capacity it is liable.' Of course in either
event its agents are responsible for torts committed by them whether
or not the municipality is liable.2 However, by statutes a municipal-
ity has been made liable for the negligence of an appointee, policeman
or fireman upon the public highways within the scope of his employ-
ment and it is obligated to save harmless the employee in such op-
erations.8  Also by statute a municipality is liable for damages for
personal injuries caused by a physician or dentist rendering medical
or dental service gratuitously to a person in a public institution main-
tained by the municipality and must save such physician or dentist
harmless for damages for personal injuries sustained by a patient by
reason of malpractice.4
The various provisions contained in these statutes which had
to be met as conditions precedent to the commencement of an action
or special proceeding against a public corporation or an officer, ap-
pointee or employee thereof were not uniform either in respect to
the contents of the notice of claim, the period prescribed for giving
the notice, the method of delivery, the persons upon whom it should
be served or the need of further service, notice or filing to commence
an action or special proceeding.
Accordingly the Judicial Council recommended to the Legisla-
tures of 1943 and 1944 amendments to the statutes to rectify the
frequent and often gross injustices by which defects in form (in part
attributable to these diverse requirements) have prevented considera-
tion on their merits of claims against municipal corporations. They
felt that:
The requirement of notice is one of the safeguards devised by the law to
protect municipalities against fraudulent and stale claims for injuries to person
and property. It is designed to afford the municipality opportunity to make an
early investigation of the claim while the facts are still "fresh". On the other
1 While it is difficult to determine when a municipal corporation is acting
in one capacity or another the exercise of the duties of policemen and firemen,
the regulation of traffic lights, the care and erection of public buildings as
prisons and court houses and the lighting of streets are examples of public
functions. See Oeters v. City of New York, 270 N. Y. 364, 1 N. E. (2d) 466
(1936); Parsons v. City of New York, 273 N. Y. 547, 7 N. E. (2d) 685
(1937) ; Wilcox v. City of Rochester, 190 N. Y. 137, 82 N. E. 1119 (1907).
The construction and operation of subways, the establishment and main-
tenance of municipal parks and markets, the collection of garbage and the
maintenance of municipal playgrounds and public beaches are examples of
private functions. See Canavan v. City of Mechanicville, 229 N. Y. 473, 128
N. E. 882 (1920) ; Clark v. City of Buffalo, 288 N. Y. 62, 41 N. E. (2d) 459(1942).2 Ottman v. Incorporated Village, 275 N. Y. 270, 9 N. E. (2d) 862 (1937).
3 GEN. MUN. LAW §§ 50-a, 50-b, 50-c.
4 See GEN. MuN. LAW § 50-d. Examples of other statutes under which
municipal corporations are made liable for actions founded upon tort are:
COUNTY LAW §§ 6, 6-a, 6-b and 6-c; TowN LAW § 67; VILLAGE LAW §§ 341
and 341-b; SECOND CLAss CITiEs LAW § 244; EDuCATiON LAW § 858-a;
HIGHWAY LAw § 215, subd. 3.
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hand "these provisions (notice statutes) were not intended as a trap for the
unwary and the ignorant." 5 An examination of the decisional law, however,
indicates that far too often technicalities in this field have prevented the dis-
position of honest claims on their merits.6
In 1944 a compromise bill was prepared as a result of conferences
with representatives of the County Officers Association, the Confer-
ence of Mayors, the Town Officers Association and several county
attorneys but failed of enactment because of the impossibility of mak-
ing certain changes before the scheduled closing of the legislative
session.
The bill was finally passed by the 1945 Legislature so that on
April 10, 1945 the General Municipal Law was amended by adding
Section 50-e and by concurrently amending Sections 50-c and 50-d
together with the other statutes affected 7 so that the provisions of
notice of claim, service thereof, etc., in connection with various types
of public corporations which were formerly contained in these statutes
were consolidated under the new Section 50-e.
The law provides briefly that in any case founded upon tort
where a claim is required by law as a condition precedent to the com-
mencement of an action or special proceeding against a public cor-
poration, as defined in the General Corporation Law, or any officer,
appointee or employee thereof, the notice shall comply with the pro-
visions of Section 50-e and it shall be given within sixty days after
the claim arises.
8
The notice shall be in writing naming the claimant and his at-
torney, the nature of the claim and "the items of damage or injuries
claimed to have been sustained so far as then practicable."
Service of the notice on the party against whom the claim is
made may be made personally or by registered mail to "the person,
officer, agent, clerk or employee designated by law as a person to
whom a summons in an action in the supreme court issued against
such party may be delivered."
While no further notice, etc., is required to commence an action
or special proceeding, notice of a defective or obstructed condition
of a street or highway or of the existence of snow or ice thereon
must still be given as a condition precedent to establish negligence
to repair or remove the same.
5 Note (1932) 17 CoRN. L. Q. 687.
6 Tenth Annual Report of the Judicial Council, 1944, p. 265.
7 See note 5 supra.
8 The Judicial Council originally recommended ninety days, the compro-
mise bill of 1944 thirty days, but the Judicial Council in renewing their rec-
ommendation for passage of the bill pointed out that a longer period would
be more equitable. See Eleventh Annual Report, Judicial Council, 1945, p. 52.
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Under certain circumstances the court may extend by a, reason-
able time the sixty-day notice provision for infants and incapacitated
persons if such application is made within a year.9
There is a provision to the effect that mistakes, omissions, ir-
regularities or defects made in the notice of claim required to be
served, not pertaining to the manner or time of service, may be cor-
rected, supplied or disregarded in the discretion of the court.
Section 50-e specifically provides that it shall not apply to claims
arising under the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Law,
nor to claims arising under Article Ten of the General Municipal
Law (regarding rights and privileges of firemen and policemen). The
Act became effective September 1, 1945 but was not to apply to
claims accruing before that date.
The, statute is a welcome step toward securing uniformity in
the preparation and presentation of tort claims against public corpo-
rations and gives promise of a more equitable administration of justice
in this field.
ROBERT E. vox ELTEN.
AMENDMENT TO THE INSURANcE LAW RELATING TO THE
RIGHTS OF JUDGMENT CREDITORS AGAINST LIABILITY INSURERS.-
Effective September 1, 1945, Section 167 of the New York Insurance
Law was amended by the addition of subsection seven.
Before the adoption of this amendment, that is, under Section
167 and its predecessor, Section 109, an action against the liability
insurer could be brought only by the injured person, or his personal
representative, who had recovered a judgment for damages against
his tort-feasor, the insured. The amendment gives this right of ac-
tion, in addition to the injured person, or his personal representative,
to three other classes of judgment creditors: assignees, contribution
creditors and indemnity creditors.
Under the common law of New York an injured party had re-
course only against the insured, his tort-feasor. He could have no
recourse against the liability insurer. If the insured was execution
proof, the injured person could collect nothing; the insured sustained
no pecuniary loss or damage and the insurer was under no duty to
pay. In 1917, to give the injured person an additional remedy, Sec-
tion 109 was adopted.
This section provided that no policy of insurance against loss
or damage resulting from an accident or injury should be valid un-
less there was contained in the policy a provision that the insolvency
or bankruptcy of the person insured or the insolvency of his estate
9 The Judicial Council originally recommended "a reasonable time after
the disability ceases" while the compromise bill of 1944 provided for sb.
months.
1945 ]
